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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MORALS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
GENERAL jurisprudential discussion does not often become the concern of
a wide audience. Outside a small specialist circle even the cultivated public
is for the most part unaware of the exchange of mighty blows that so consumes
the academics. But occasionally a controversy is, or is thought to be, of such
central importance or of such practical implication that it breaks out of the
cloister and becomes a subject of general notice. This has happened recently
in England over the question of the relationship between the criminal law and
general morality.
The discussion was set off by a lecture delivered by Lord Devlin (Sir
Patrick Devlin as he then was) as the 1959 Maccabeean Lecture in Jurispru-
dence of the British Academy, under the title, "The Enforcement of Morals."'
A partial explanation of the interest aroused by this lecture is no doubt to be
found in the person of its author. British judges do not often speak publicly
on basic jurisprudential topics, and when a judge of Lord Devlin's eminence
does so his pronouncements are rightly given close attention. Again, Lord
Devlin had taken as his text certain important statements of policy advanced
in the Report of the Wolfenden Committee on Homosexual Offences and
Prostitution 2 and this Report had itself been a matter of lively public dis-
cussion. But the feature of Lord Devlin's lecture that aroused most interest
and generated most heat was that his central thesis appeared to be an attack
on a view of the nature and function of the criminal law which had been
accepted for so long by an important section of public opinion that it might
fairly be called the orthodoxy on this point. The position under attack is
the utilitarian or Benthamite view of morality and law.
In Bentham's view, man is placed "under the empire of pleasure and of
pain." 8 Under his principle of utility all human action is to be scrutinized
against the criterion of its tendency to produce pleasure or pain and judged
by the final balance in the pleasure-pain ledger, by the felicific calculus.
Pleasure and pain are not here to be understood in the grossest physical
sense, for they include emotional enrichments and deprivation. (Bentham
includes in his list such pleasures as friendship, good reputation, benevolence,
1. THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS. By Sir Patrick Arthur Devlin. London: Oxford
University Press, 1959. Pp. 25, 3s. 6d. [hereinafter cited as DEVIIN]. Lord Devlin's
lecture is discussed in Hart, Immorality and Treason, The Listener (London), July 30,
1959, pp. 162-63; Wollheim, Crime, Sin and Mr. Justice Devlin, Encounter, November,
1959, pp. 34-40; Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAlM. L.J. 174; Hart, The Use
and Abuse of the Criminal Law, 4 OXFORD LAw. 7 (1961).
2. Great Britain Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, Report, CUD.
No. 247 (1957) (Wolfenden Report).
3, BNTHAm, TnF9RY QF LEs4 AToN 2 (Hildreth ed. 1876).
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and knowledge and their corresponding pains.) 4 Man must be taken in his
actual constitution and subjected to an essentially social, communal judg-
ment: "That which is conformable to the utility, or the interest of a com-
munity, is what tends to augment the total sum of the happiness of the in-
dividuals that compose it."r' By the judgment of the legislator it is bad for
X to do that which brings him 5 units of pleasure if it is likely in sum to
bring 6 units of pain to others. For Bentham, there is no other admissible test
of the rightness or wrongness of action and, in the first instance, the test
must be the same whether we speak in moral or legislative terms.
If [the partisan of the principle of utility] finds in the common list of
offences some indifferent action, some innocent pleasure, he will not
hesitate to transport this pretended offence ifito the class of lawful
actions; he will pity the pretended criminals, and will reserve his in-
dignation for their persecutors.6
But the criteria for the advisability of criminal legislation are not at all
stages the same as the criteria for the simple moral judgment of condemna-
tion. Even though an act may be condemned as immoral by the operation of
the principle of utility, there may be other outbalancing reasons why it should
not be condemned by the criminal law. The chief of these, in Bentham's
exposition, would be that the punishment would be inefficacious as a deterrent,
that is, where it would not prevent the disapproved conduct; secondly, that the
punishment would be unprofitable, that is, where the mischief produced by
the criminal prohibition would be greater than the mischief produced by
letting the disapproved act go unpunished; and, thirdly, that the punishment
would be needless, that is, where the mischief may be prevented without the
punishment. 7 In all these cases, Bentham would have the acts go unpunished,
even though they were morally reprehensible under the principle of utility.
Moreover, Bentham recognized that when legislators calculate the harmful-
ness of conduct they must pay attention to the attitude of the public at large
toward such conduct, however irrational such attitude may seem to be. His
position here is put in a powerful passage, which deserves quotation for its
particular relevance to this topic:
But when I say that antipathies and sympathies are no reason, I mean
those of the legislator; for the antipathies and sympathies of the people
may be reasons, and very powerful ones. However odd or pernicious a
religion, a law, a custom may be, it is of no consequence, so long as the
people are attached to it. The strength of their prejudice is the measure of
the indulgence which should be granted to it .... The legislator ought
to yield to the violence of a current which carries away everything that
obstructs it.
But ought the legislator to be a slave to the fancies of those whom he
governs? No. Between an imprudent opposition and a servile compliance,
4. Id. at 20-27.
5. Id.at2.
6. Id. at 3-4.
7. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 281-88 (Harrison ed. 1948).
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there is a middle path, honourable and safe. It is, to combat these fancies
with the only arms that can conquer them,--example and instruction. He
must enlighten the people, he must address himself to the public reason;
he must give time for error to be unmasked.
It is to be observed, however, that too much deference for prejudices, is
a more common fault than the contrary excess.
8
As a system of moral philosophy the principle of utility has come untler
telling attack. It has been pointed out that the notions of pleasure and pain
are subjective, so that what X may experience as pleasure Y may experience
as pain. In this way there may be a clash of interests, and Bentham provides
no guide for the individual who is faced with such a clash. Indeed, according
to the notion of the empire of pleasure and pain, man must ineluctably act
in a way that brings pleasure to him. He can have no reason for acting
in any other way whatever harm his acts may bring to others. If a good action
is one that brings more pleasure than pain, it is then difficult to see in what
sense the individual can be said to act wrongly except in the sense of a social
judgment of what is pleasure and pain for the greatest number.9 Again, it
has been said that pleasure and pain are not susceptible to nice calculation. °
The moral arithmetic here must be very sketchy and must often be no more
than an intuition or guess. But, as his defenders have insisted, Bentham was
not in fact so much interested in constructing a moral philosophy as in erect-
ing a method of approach for the legislator. His primary interest was in law
making and law reform. Viewed in this light, many of the weaknesses of the
principle of utility disappear. Thus, in practice we are not so much concerned
with the individual's view of what is for him pleasure or pain as with a
social view of what is pleasure or pain for the greatest number. It is in the
sphere of public decisions with respect to the greatest happiness of the greatest
number that the principle of utility is designed to operate, rather than in the
individual's guiding of his personal life. And when the technique is confined
to the making of public decisions, the clash between individual and public in-
terest is no longer strictly relevant. The objection of the roughness of the
calculation also loses much of its force when made in this context. For, though
in personal life there may be agonizing choices between two courses of action
in both of which are nicely balanced the pleasure-pain account, the ledger in
public decisions, such as those reflected in criminal legislation, will be read in
millions of units and all that will be required is reasonable conviction of a
substantial benefit. As Dicey put it, one does not need to weigh butcher's
meat in diamond scales."
8. BENTHAMk, op. cit. supra note 3, at 76-77.
9. Ayer, The Principle of Utility, in JEREMY BENTIIAM AND THE LAW 245, 248-49
(1948); FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 267-75 (4th ed. 1960). Cf. HALEVY, THE GROWTH
OF PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALISM 54-73 (Morris ed. 1928) ; STONE, PROVINCE AND FUNCTION
OF LAW 267-96 (1947).
10. Ayer, mtpra note 9, at 247,257-58.
11. DIcEy, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 141 (2d ed. 1914).
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This Benthamite approach does not of course reduce criminal legislation to
a process of strict calculation. In the first place, there may be genuine dispute
about the actual consequences of conduct that it is sought to prohibit or no
longer to prohibit, or about the consequences of the prohibition or its removal.
So, one may argue about the precise deterrent effect of capital punishment, or
about the possible spread of homosexuality if the criminal prohibition were
removed. The resolution of such arguments clearly depends very much on the
available information about social practices and the impact of laws. Again,
even if in agreement about the actual consequences of conduct or of criminal
prohibition or, more often, while still in disagreement about them, one may
also dispute whether certain consequences should be regarded as harmful.
That is to say that even in the public sphere there may be disagreements about
pleasures and pains. This disagreement may take two forms. It may be a
simple denial by one side that an admitted consequence is harmful at all. So,
one may agree that to remove the criminal prohibition from homosexual
conduct will lead to an increase in such conduct but may simply not regard
this as harmful. Secondly, the disagreement may be less abrupt and more
quantitative, i.e., one may agree that a spread of homosexuality is harmful but
may regard it as much less harmful than does the other side and, on the
other hand, may regard the effects of law enforcement in this field as much
more harmful than does the other side. Disagreements of the first kind (a
total clash over the harmful character of an admitted consequence) are
probably rare, and the more typical conflict is between two views of the
degree of harm involved, usually complicated by a disagreement over the
actual consequences to be expected. Thus, the Benthamite approach neither
eliminates clashes over values nor does it provide any simple resolution of
such conflicts; it is not a legislative computer. This cannot be better
demonstrated than by the dramatic twentieth century shift in Bentham's own
emphasis on individual liberty and laissez faire economics in his concrete
application of the principle of utility.
But what is, or ought to be, enduring is the Benthamite method of public
debate about public decision making. Bentham's values may not always be our
values but his method of discussion ought to be our method. In the first place,
he insisted upon obtaining the best possible information for decision making,
demanding careful investigation of actual social behavior and institutions,
delicate projection of contemplated legislation in terms of its probable effects,
and public scrutiny and discussion of such information. In so doing, Bentham
became the great forerunner of modem sociological and realist schools of
jurisprudence. The other fundamental aspect of his method of discussion was
an insistence upon an explicit statement of value positions and their defense,
as far as this may be possible, in rational debate. Legislation and decision-
making, he felt, must be examined in the arena of reasoned discussion in the
light of information about their probable consequences and the values which
they profess to serve. This is the method of modem democracy; it is the
method of the common law courts in England at their best; it is the method of
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the United States Supreme Court. It involves the recognition that though
rational argument cannot solve disputes about conflicts of values, such argu-
ment can solve a host of problems on which there is no real dispute about
values and that, even when such a dispute exists, the insistence on reasonable
public discussion is of the greatest importance in aiding judgment and in-
fluencing opinion. This is a tradition which we readily accept and in which we
are now immersed, but it is no more than two centuries old and Bentham was
its prophet and nurse.
If Lord Devlin's lecture involved no more than a disagreement with what
is probably the majority of current intelligent opinion on the evaluation of the
present state of the law in the field of sexual offences and certain other fields,
its appearance would not have been so profoundly important. Lord Devlin's
thesis is so very disquieting because it constitutes an attack on the whole
Benthamite position of rational debate about public decision making. It is
here that Lord Devlin's views become dangerous and here that they must be
resolutely opposed.
Lord Devlin begins by recognizing that the present law of sexual offences
in Britain is haphazard and not always closely linked with popular moral
notions. The question he wishes to consider is whether there are any principles
which can regulate the embodiment of the moral law in the criminal law. The
inquiry must be a general one and cannot be confined to the field of sexual
morals. The question is:
What is the connexion between crime and sin and to what extent, if at
all, should the criminal law of England concern itself with the enforce-
ment of morals and punish sin or immorality as such ?12
There is, already, in these opening passages an identification of the con-
cepts of immorality and sin which is disturbing to the secular-minded reader.
Lord Devlin is to be excused somewhat here for he was concerned with the
report of the Wolfenden Committee which had set a bad example by equating
immorality and sin. The vital passages in the Report of the Committee are
those which put forward:
Our own formulation of the function of the criminal law so far as it
concerns the subjects of this enquiry. In this field, its function, as we see
it, is to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from
what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against
exploitation and corruption of others, particularly those who are specially
vulnerable because they are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced,
or in a state of special physical, official or economic dependence.
It is not, in our view, the function of the law to intervene in the
private lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of
behavior, further than is necessary to carry out the purposes we have
outlined.13
12. D xi 4.13, Op. cit. stipra note 2, ff 13.
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The Committee recommended:
That homosexual behavior between consenting adults in private should
no longer be a criminal offence [following on the argument] which we
believe to be decisive, namely, the importance which society and the law
ought to give to individual freedom of choice and action in matters of
private morality. Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society,
acting through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with
that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality
which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business. To say this is
not to condone or encourage private immorality. 14
In Lord Devlin's view this amounts to setting up a concept of private
immorality which is to be prohibited criminally only if it infringes certain
further criteria, and it is with this view that Lord Devlin proceeds to take
issue.
"As a judge," he writes, "I should feel handicapped in my task if I thought
that I was addressing an audience which had no sense of sin or which thought
of crime as something quite different."15 Why, he asks, do we not treat a
female abortionist as an unlicensed midwife in passing sentence? 16 His tacit
answer is because the former impinges on our sense of sin. Here, it may be
suggested, is the first example of a series of somewhat misleading illustrations
which Lord Devlin uses to support his argument. There is evidently a large
legal gap between the notion of a midwife, whether licensed or unlicensed,
who aims and endeavours to deliver a child safely and an abortionist who aims
to terminate a pregnancy. The question of whether the termination of
pregnancy ought to be a criminal offense is a separate question on which
there is a good deal of dispute. But, as the law stands, it is a serious felony,
and it is natural that this should be reflected in the sentencing policy of the
courts. If abortion were legalized (as some argue it should be) then,
presumably, an unlicensed abortionist would be treated in the same way as
an unlicensed midwife. The example thus seems to have little point except to
indicate a present judgment of the criminal law that the termination of
pregnancy is generally illegal. It is difficult to see that this has much to do
with a sense of sin, and even Lord Devlin admits later in his lecture that
many people do not think abortion to be wrong.17
Lord Devlin believes that "a complete separation of crime from sin . . .
would not be good for the moral law and might be disastrous for the
criminal.' u 8 The opposite point of view to this, he suggests, is that which
holds that "A state which refuses to enforce Christian beliefs has lost the
right to enforce Christian morals."' 9 But, he goes on, "If this view is sound,
14. Id., 1 61 and 62.
15. D vxN 6.
16. Ibid.
17. DEVLiN 24; see text at note 68 infra.
18. DLVuN 6.
19. Id. at 7.
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it means that the criminal law cannot justify any of its provisions by reference
to the moral law. It cannot say, for example, that murder and theft are
prohibited because they are immoral or sinful."20
Much is involved in these statements. How far the administration of the
law and the control of crime depend on a sense of sin, if by that is meant a
religiously oriented sense, is arguable, but it is no doubt true that a strong and
widely held acceptance of religious teaching is on the whole a valuable sup-
porter of law enforcement agencies, unless the law itself offends against
religious tenets. If for a sense of sin we substitute the notion of a sense of
infringing morality without the religious connotation, then it is difficult to
see how such a sense could ever be completely separated from the state of the
law. To contemplate such a possibility is to ignore the interdependence of law
and morality while seeming to defend it. The pressure exerted by generally
held views of what is right and wrong upon legislatures when legislating, the
support that the law in its administration receives from such widely held
feelings, and, in turn, the support that general feelings of right and wrong
receive from law enforcement are inevitable facts of the system of social
control.21 The exact nature of the interdependence may be debated, the
comparative importance of the law as compared with general feelings of
morality may be the subject of controversy, but the existence of some inter-
dependence is unquestionable. But this still leaves open the question of
whether it is wise and proper to prohibit criminally any particular species of
conduct. It is probable, for example, that the "sense of sin" to which Lord
Devlin refers, is most often felt by most people with respect to aspects of
their behavior into which the criminal law does not enter at all. It is, for
the most part, with respect to cowardice, cruelty to others, or parsimony that
the sense of sin is felt. With all this the criminal law has very little to do.
There are indeed situations in which a sense of wrongdoing might be keenly
felt by the individual, where the criminal law might well interfere, but where,
in common law jurisdictions, it has chosen not to do so. An example of this
would be the absence of a legal duty to aid others in peril.
The greatest confusion is introduced, however, by Lord Devlin's casual
shifts from general references to morality to specific references to "sin,"
"Christian morals" and the "moral law." (The "moral law" is an ambiguous
term which seems to attempt to get the best of both worlds, by being free of
overt theological implications, but at the same time obliquely implying
authoritative attributes by the use of the word "law.") His objection to the
point of view that "a state which refuses to enforce Christian beliefs has lost
the right to enforce Christian morals" need not detain us long, since to talk
of a "right" to legislate does not seem very meaningful. One may discuss
20. Ibid.
21. See LUNDSTEDT, SUPERSTITION OR RATIONALITY IN ACTION FOR PEACE pasSim
(1925) ; LUNDSTEDT, LAW AND JUSTICE (AcTA INSTITUTI UPSALIENSIS IURISPRUDENTIAE
COmPARATrVAE I) (1952); O.IVECRONA, LAW AS FACT passim (1939).
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whether the state of the law or contemplated legislation is prudent or wise but
nothing seems to be added by questioning the "right" to legislate, unless one
is talking in terms of constitutional law, which Lord Devlin clearly is not.
The greatest difficulty here, however, is to give any precision to ideas of
moral law or Christian morality. Lord Devlin's examples of murder and
theft seem particularly ill chosen. One has not heard that it was or is legal to
murder and steal in Classical Greece or Rome, in modem Muslim countries
or in Soviet Russia. The criminal prohibitions of murder and theft are of
course extremely easy to defend on utilitarian grounds. This is not to deny
the importance of the sense of horror that most men have at the contemplar
tion of killing. The derivation of that sense, and how much it owes to im-
memorial law enforcement may be left to the psychologists and anthropolo-
gists for there is no need to inquire into it nor into any religious beliefs in
order to justify the present state of the law. Indeed, if one addresses oneself
seriously to the question of what issues in the contemporary criminal law
appear to be vitally connected with specifically Christian beliefs, or the beliefs
of specific Christian sects, it is only in very controversial fields such as the
prohibition of contraceptive practices, abortion, sterilization and euthanasia
that examples occur. Here the arguments rage, and to refer one to Christian
morals is to beg the questions and not to answer them.
Lord Devlin does proceed to bring his generalities on Christian morals and
the moral law to a practical concentration on certain aspects of sexual moral-
ity. "It is true," we are told, "that for many centuries the criminal law was
much concerned with keeping the peace and little, if at all, with sexual morals.
But it would be wrong to infer from that that it had no moral content ....,22
It is difficult to see why anyone should dream of making such an inference
unless he took the peculiar view that morality was restricted to questions of
sexual behavior. Yet at times Lord Devlin himself seems to approach this
view for he tells us, very oddly, on the same page that, "Rules which impose
a speed limit or prevent an obstruction on the highway have nothing to do
with morals." It is, to say the least, possible to argue that it is much more
immoral deliberately to choose to exceed a speed limit and so put one's
fellows in great danger than to take a minority view of the proper object of
sexual activity.
In another general attack on the position which he characterizes as a
separation of law and morality, Lord Devlin lists a number of existing
criminal law principles whose justification he cannot find in any utilitarian
principle of "the preservation of order and decency" and which therefore
must be justified, he argues, in terms of some moral law which cannot be
pinned down in concrete terms.2 The examples put forward are the effect
given the consent of the victim generally in criminal law and in particular
the effect given consent to euthanasia, suicide, attempted suicide, abortion,
incest and duelling. These examples certainly deserve close attention.
22. DEvLIN 7.
23. Id. at 8-9.
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On the point of consent generally it would seem that Lord Devlin does not
state the present law in England in sufficient detail. His assertions that "the
criminal law has never permitted consent of the victim to be used as a de-
fence" and that "It is not a defence to any form of assault that the victim
thought his punishment well deserved and submitted to it ... ." 24 are almost
certainly too emphatic and consequently misleading. The position in fact ap-
pears to be that in the general crime of assault at common law the consent of
the victim will be a defense provided that no serious bodily harm was
caused.25 If serious bodily harm is caused it is easy to see why consent should
be no defense. There is the general loss to society of the services of the
victim when serious bodily harm is inflicted and a consequent possible im-
position on the public charge. Then there is the danger that if X may with
impunity inflict serious bodily harm on Y with Y's consent, X may by a
process of addiction, as it were, come to inflict serious harm on those who do
not consent. But most important of course is the simple postulation by
society that the infliction of serious bodily harm is an evil which is not
negatived by the presence of consent. This may be expressed either by saying
that such consent can never be regarded as rational and therefore is to be
ignored, or by saying that even if the consent is free and full it is nevertheless
to be ignored. No one, presumably, would wish to alter the state of the
law on this point, so it is certainly an example of unanimous moral feeling
reflected in the criminal law. It therefore supports any argument as to the
coincidence of law and morals which is content with saying that a community's
deeply held and widely shared values are often protected by criminal legisla-
tion. But there is no need to defend such law in mysterious terms which are
divorced from utilitarian notions. It can be defended simply by saying that
in the publicly drawn pleasure-pain ledger of the society the infliction of
grievous bodily harm is by public judgment in all cases to be counted as an
evil that outweighs the good of freedom of action and choice. Whether that
judgment of society is in itself rational is not a question capable of rational
answer. Lord Devlin seems to be suggesting a level of "rational" justifica-
tion for criminal prohibition (which has to do with talk of order, decency etc.)
and on the other hand a level of "irrational" justification which refers only to
moral feelings or the "moral law," and his argument seems to be that the
first method of justification sometimes fails and we have to have recourse to
the second. The answer is that there are not two methods but only one which
is more or less rational and more or less irrational. Our anxiety should be
24. Id. at 8.
25. See The King v. Donovan, [1934] 2 K.B. 498; The Queen v. Coney, [1882] 8
Q.B.D. 534; Regina v. Orton, [1878] 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 226; Regina v. Young, [1866] 10
Cox Crim. Cas. 371; Christopherson v. Bare, 11 Q.B. 473, 116 Eng. Rep. 554 (1848) ; Rex
v. Perkins, 4 C. & P. 537, 172 Eng. Rep. 814 (Oxford Assizes 1831) ; People v. Cohoon,
315 Ill. App. 259, 42 N.E.2d 969 (1942); State v. Archer, 22 S.D. 137, 115 N.W. 1075
(1908) ; Smith v. State, 12 Ohio St. 466, 80 Am. Dec. 355 (1861) ; Beale, Consent in the
Criminal Law, 8 HAav. L. REv. 317 (1895).
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to make it as rational as possible; the danger of Lord Devlin's way of put-
ting things is that it is likely to make it as irrational as possible.
On the question of killing with consent, the body of opinion in favor of
legalizing euthanasia indicates that the view of law and morality advanced by
Lord Devlin is not beyond dispute.2 6 Nevertheless, it must be admitted that
there is no argument for a general legalizing of all killings with the consent
of the victim. Many jurisdictions, however, do provide a lesser penalty in such
cases, which demonstrates a recognition of a lessening of the moral guilt in-
volved.2 7 But arguments other than the dictates of morality may be advanced
to defend the present state of the law-the interest of society in prohibiting a
diminution of its members, the potentially damaging effect on the character of
the killer, and, most cogent of all, the great difficulty in many cases of being
satisfied that a full and free consent has been obtained. One might also point
here to evidence that those who consent to being killed (or indeed to having
grievous bodily harm inflicted on them) are for the most part mentally sick
so that a full and free consent is too rare and uncertain a phenomenon for
the law to rely upon.
With respect to suicide, the actual movement of public opinion has been such
that, since Lord Devlin wrote, both suicide and attempted suicide have ceased
to be criminal offenses in Britain.28 Abortion again is an act whose criminal
character is much in dispute and whose prohibition, it may reasonably be
claimed, causes more social harm than would the legalization of such prac-
tices under specified conditions and with appropriate safeguards. 29 Likewise,
there seems little reason why incest should be a crime, unless perhaps for
eugenic reasons or in circumstances where it would amount to some other
existing crime. Indeed, at present the great majority of prosecutions for
incest are in cases where the act at the same time amounts to some other
sexual offense. As for duelling, it is easy to find utilitarian reasons for its
prohibition. Such combats have an obvious tendency to lead to bodily harm
or death and so all the arguments cited above with respect to the relevance of
consent here apply.
The examples offered by Lord Devlin thus fall for the most part into that
area of the criminal law which is presently the subject of keen debate. That
debate has arisen precisely because it is felt by many people that there are
no good utilitarian reasons for the perpetuation of criminal sanctions for
some of these acts. To cite their presence in the criminal law as a rebuttal of
the utilitarian position is thus not a tenable argument. In some instances,
it shows no more than that the criminal law is in an antiquated and unreason-
26. See WILLIAMS, THE SANcTITY OF LIFE AND THE CR iNAL LAw 329-50 (1957);
ST. JoHN-STEvAs, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAw 261-78 (1961).
27. German Federal Republic, STRAFGESETZBUCH § 216; Italy, CODICE PENALE art. 579.
Similar provisions are to be found in the penal codes of the Netherlands, Spain, Poland and
Uruguay.
28. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60.
29. See the discussion in Wn.AzAs, op. cit. supra note 26, at 146-247.
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able state. In others, where the prohibition is one which still commands
general support, as in the cases of killing and causing serious bodily harm
with consent, it merely demonstrates that some generally agreed values of
society are accurately reflected in the criminal law. The task of the investiga-
tor and legislator must be one of constant inquiry into the accuracy of the
reflection of existing values in the criminal law and a constant appraisal of
those values themselves, in so far as they are open to rational appraisal. Ita
is dangerously easy to point to an existing criminal prohibition as evidence
of a community value, when in fact the law may lag well behind mores. It
is even more dangerous to be dissuaded from examination of the alleged
community value merely because it is expressed in an ancient criminal
prohibition.
Lord Devlin proceeds in his inquiry by framing three questions which he
suggests are helpful to the discussion. The first and second are as follows:
1. Has society the right to pass judgment at all on matters of morals?
Ought there, in other words, to be a public morality, or are morals
always a matter for private judgment?
2. If society has the right to pass judgment, has it also the right to use
the weapon of the law to enforce it ?3o
The use of the word "right" here is odd. As a matter of fact social attitudes
of approval or disapproval grow up with regard to modes of conduct. To say
that they are matters of morals is to say that they are modes of conduct
about which such attitudes exist. What then can be meant by asking if there
is a "right" here? It would appear from the general trend of Lord Devlin's
argument that he is referring here by "matters of morals" to matters of sexual
behavior, but, even so, it seems unhelpful to talk in terms of rights. Lord
Devlin is not adverting here to the advisability of passing laws on such
points because this is the subject matter of his third interrogatory. He clearly
treats the first and second questions as something anterior, and it is in this
sense that it is difficult to see what can be meant. Indeed, in turning to his
answer to this self examination we find that the reply only amounts to a
declaration that there is such a thing as a public morality, i.e., widely held
attitudes of approval or disapproval towards certain modes of conduct.31 But
surely no one ever doubted this. His discussion is more enlightening when
he turns to the subject matter of his third question:
3. If so [i.e., if society has the right to pass laws on matters of morals]
ought it to use that weapon in all cases or only in some: and if only in
some, on what principles should it distinguish ?u
Lord Devlin's three questions thus resolve themselves into only one
legitimate question, which might be phrased as follows:
30. DEVLiN 9.
31. Id. at 10-12.
32. Id. at 9.
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In what circumstances should a legislature criminally prohibit a course
of conduct which is disapproved by widely held public opinion? [If the
difference is felt to be one of substance, the word "immoral" may be
substituted for "disapproved by widely held public opinion."]
This contention, it is submitted, is borne out by the fact that in answering his
three questions, Lord Devlin is in fact almost exclusively concerned with the
dilemma posed by his third interrogatory.
Before society may intervene, Lord Devlin suggests, there must be a
"collective judgment" 33 of disapproval against the conduct in question. But
it is not at all clear what he means by "collective judgment" for he admits that
"Some people sincerely believe that homosexuality is neither immoral nor
unnatural," but suggests that there is a collective judgment against it.a4 Even
though one dearly cannot offer a criterion of any precision for measuring the
diffusion and strength of public feeling that ought to influence a legislature
in debating the advisability of a criminal prohibition, it is, nevertheless, a
matter that deserves as close an inquiry as may be possible. A great many
laws are kept on the books by assertions of public revulsion which might not
stand up on examination. Three factors deserve consideration: (1) the
proportion of the community who disapprove of the practice, (2) the strength
of their disapproval (will they riot or attack those who practise it if it is
legalized?) and (3) the qualitative nature of the majority and minority
groups (a strong majority of cultivated opinion may be significant even
if it is but a minority of public opinion as a whole). The importance of these
inquiries is too easily obscured by the simple demand for a "collective judg-
ment," though it is true that Lord Devlin does return later to the question
of the strength of the disapproval.
Lord Devlin also tells us that the collective judgment is only justified if
"society is affected" by the practice.3 5 In terms of the "right to pass judg-
ment" this does not mean very much, but in terms of the advisability of legis-
lation it means a great deal and appears to be a strange surrender of Lord
Devlin's major argument that the utilitarian test is unsatisfactory. And it is
followed by a strange linking of the collective judgment with certain sub-
sidiary prohibitions of an obviously utilitarian aspect.
If society is not prepared to say that homosexuality is morally wrong,
there would be no basis for a law protecting youth from "corruption"
or punishing a man for living on the "immoral" earnings of a homo-
sexual prostitute .... 36
But this seems greatly misconceived. The drinking of alcohol is not generally
regarded as immoral in itself, yet there are laws prohibiting minors from
drinking on licensed premises. Heterosexual activity is not per se immoral,
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yet there are laws prohibiting assualts on young girls (even with their con-
sent) and laws making it criminal to live on the earnings of a female prosti-
tute. To prohibit acts of a similar nature in a homosexual context need not
involve a general judgment about homosexual acts between consenting adults.
The same analytical lapse marks Lord Devlin's reference to monogamy,
which he regards as an institution that is "built-in" to our society. "The in-
stitution of marriage would be gravely threatened if individual judgments
were permitted about the morality of adultery ..... 7 This view appears to
be shared by Dean Rostow in his comment on Lord Devlin's lecture. After
referring to the prosecutions of Mormons in the United States, he writes:
Should we not then conclude that monogamy is so fundamental a theme
in the existing common morality of the United States that the condem-
nation of polygamy as a crime is justified, even though in the end the
repugnance to it rests on "feeling" and not on "reason"? 33
But the relationship between the institution of monogamy and the criminal
law is or may be much more complex than these comments indicate. To what
extent are individual judgments about adultery not permitted? In England
adultery is not a crime, though it is of course a ground for divorce. Bigamy
is a crime but as such has come under a good deal of attack. It has been sug-
gested that it be removed from the statute-book in its present general form
and reincorporated as a sexual offense where it involves fraud on a female
and, on the other hand, reduced to a summary offense against the registration
laws where it involves two parties one of whom knows the other to be already
married.39 One must agree with Lord Devlin and Dean Rostow that it is
difficult to conceive of any Western system abandoning monogamy as an
institution. Indeed, even in non-Western and non-Christian countries the
trend is towards monogamy, presumably because it is an efficient, useful
and easily organizable mode. But there is always the question of how much
debate and how much change we can contemplate in our society. Monogamy
exists at the moment side by side with a heavy divorce rate and, presumably,
side by side with a great deal of adultery. Monogamy is thus only protected
by the criminal law to a limited extent, and what is ensured and protected is
not the indissoluble sexual union of one man and one woman but rather a
form of registration entailing certain legal consequences which again can
be dissolved in certain eventualities. It is thus quite possible to conclude that
the criminal prohibition of bigamy is or ought to be aimed at suppressing two
evils: (1) the procurement of sexual relations by fraud, and (2) the con-
fusion of a public system of registration on which a host of rights, duties,
powers and privileges depends. Indeed, no other conclusion is possible, for
what other evil is to be seen in bigamy unless one takes the frankly religious
37. DLIN= 11.
38. Rostow, supra note 1, at 190.
39. Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REv. 71, 76-78 (1945); Williams,
Bigamy and the Third Marriage, 13 MoDE= L. REv. 417, 424-27 (1950).
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position of regarding it as a defiling of a sacrament? Making bigamy a crime
is thus just as defensible on utilitarian grounds as is making a crime of rape
or voting twice.
Later in his lecture, Lord Devlin gives it as his view that "Adultery of the
sort that breaks up marriage seems to me to be just as harmful to the social
fabric as homosexuality or bigamy." 40 Adultery is not a crime in England,
he thinks, because "a law which made it a crime would be too difficult to en-
force; it is too generally regarded as a human weakness not suitably punished
by imprisonment. "41 That adultery is a human weakness is not a very con-
vincing reason for not punishing it. So is cheating on one's income tax re-
turns. The sensible reason for not punishing adultery is surely the recognition
that happy marriages are not made by the criminal law. It may be difficult to
measure the social value secured by some criminal sexual prohibitions, but it
can scarcely be doubted that no good at all would ensue in Britain from de-
claring adultery to be a criminal offense.
Lord Devlin attacks the approach of the Wolfenden Committee as being
"wrong in principle" 42 in endeavouring to specify those circumstances in
which it may be proper for the criminal law to intervene. The Wolfenden Com-
mittee with regard to sexual offenses had characterized these circumstances
among others as including the "exploitation and corruption of others. ' 43
Lord Devlin suggests that this is so wide a characterization that it "can be
supported only if it is accepted that the law is concerned with immorality as
such."'44 It may well be that the exploitation and corruption of others is so
wide a formulation as not to be of much practical help in a given case. Indeed
it may be a mistake to attempt to confine the proper conditions for legal
intervention within any single comprehensive formula. But the task should
rather be of intensive investigation of social consequences in each particular
case. The danger of Lord Devlin's approach is that an established evaluation of
collective judgments in society should replace the social research that is neces-
sary. The alarming tendency of Lord Devlin's thesis becomes more apparent
when he turns to the question of how the collective judgment of society is to be
ascertained. "It is," he tells us, "that of the reasonable man. He is not to be con-
fused with the rational man. He is not expected to reason about anything and his
judgment may be largely a matter of feeling. ' 45 "Immorality then, for the pur-
pose of the law, is what every right-minded person is presumed to consider to
be immoral." 46
Here is an overt rejection of rationality startling in its frankness. The
yardstick is to be the feeling of right minded people, though we are not told
40. DEVLiN 22.
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 13.
43. See text at note 13 supra.
44. DEvLiN 13.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 16.
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who are to be considered "right minded." Without qualification, this remark-
able statement has a frightening evocation of the notorious Nazi law of 1935
that empowered the judges to punish acts that deserved punishment "accord-
ing to the healthy instincts of the people."47 Much of the sting is, however,
removed by the qualifications that Lord Devlin proceeds to offer. We are told
that "there must be toleration of the maximum individual freedom that is
consistent with the integrity of society"48 and that "nothing should be
punished by the law that does not lie beyond the limits of tolerance." 4 The
first is a very large admission and the second almost:tautologous. We are told
further that "majority dislike" is not enough; there must be-a "real feeling of
reprobation."5 0 So, with respect to homosexual behaviour, "I do not think one
can ignore disgust if it is deeply felt and not manufactured. Its presence is a
good indication that the bounds of toleration are being reached."' ' It is this
feeling of disgust that is taken, in Lord Devlin's view, to justify the criminal
prohibition of cruelty to animals. 2
The prohibition of cruelty to animals had earlier been considered by
Bentham as an exercise in the theory of utility. His answer had been forth-
right:
It may come one day to be recognized that the number of legs, the
villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate [ix..
the caprice of a tormentor]. What else is it that should trace the insuper-
able line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of dis-
course? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more
rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or
a week, or even a month old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what
would it avail? The question is not, Can -they reason? nor, Can they
talk? but, Can they suffer?53
Is this not much more satisfactory than to rest content with the mere ob-
servation of the reasonable man's wave of disgust? The Benthamite method
compels us to do our best to express our disgust in the language of values.
The value here advanced is that the infliction of suffering on any sensate
creature is to be deplored and prohibited, unless there are very compelling
reasons that outbalance this value (as in the case of vivisection). If we pursue
this rigorous method into the example of homosexual behaviour, it can be
seen that the reaction of disgust which it is alleged is felt by the majority of
right thinking men is much less easy to state in the form of a defensible value
judgment. Here the disgust is perhaps more akin to the disgust which some
people may feel about gluttony or snoring or wearing gaudy ties. One cannot
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53. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 412 n.1 (Hafrison ed. 1948).
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help suspecting that the morality of an established caste is being too unin-
quiringly proffered here as the morality of the right thinking majority. For is
it not a strange society that is disgusted at private, consensual, homosexual
behaviour, but can look with equanimity upon fox and stag hunting? Such an
established morality sustained a severe shock recently in Britain when the
men and women in a jury box could not be persuaded to condemn Lady
Chatterley's Lover as an obscene book.54 It is not beyond the bounds of
possibility that proper inquiry might reveal that, while the ordinary man
contemplates homosexual behaviour with aversion and distaste, the knowledge
of its practise by others does not disgust him so deeply as Lord Devlin sus-
pects. The disgust of the ordinary man is a dangerous guide for legislation,
but judicial reliance upon notions of what disgusts the ordinary man is even
more dangerous. Popular prejudice, wrote Bentham,
serves oftener as a pretext than as a motive. It is a convenient cover
for the weakness of statesmen. The ignorance of the people is the
favourite argument of pusillanimity and indolence; while the real motives
are prejudices from which the legislators themselves have not been able
to get free. The name of the people is falsely used to justify their
leaders. 5
Indeed, the casual introduction into English criminal law of the statutory pro-
vision creating the offense of gross indecency between men is a perfect
example of the harm that may be done by enacting a criminal prohibition
without full contemplation of its possible consequences. 6
If the powerful feelings of the ordinary man are to be a guide to legislation,
where are we to stop? There has been in recent years in Britain powerful
pressure for the reintroduction of corporal punishment. The Home Secretary,
while stoutly resisting this pressure, has admitted that the majority of public
opinion favors such a reintroduction.5 7 These majority feelings are probably
strong and passionate. They must nevertheless not be acceded to, as the
government has happily realized.
Lord Devlin pursues this matter of the criminal prohibition of homo-
sexuality by saying:
We should ask ourselves in the first instance whether, looking at it
calmly and dispassionately, we regard it as a vice so abominable that
its mere presence is an offence. If that is the genuine feeling of the society
in which we live, I do not see how society can be denied the right to
eradicate it.'-
54. The Queen v. Penguin Books Ltd., [1961] CmTU. L. REv. (Eng.) 176; THE TRIAL
op LADY CHATTERLEY (Rolph ed. 1961) ; Clark, Obscenity, The Law and Lady Chatterley,
[1961] CRixm. L. REv. (Eng.) (pts. 1-2) 156, 224.
55. 1 BENTHAu, THEORY OF LEGIsLATIoN 78 (Hildreth ed. 1876).
56. See Sr. JOHN-STEVAS, op. cit. supra note 26, at 210. DIcEY, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 41-42, comments on the circularity of the process by which legislation with the passage
of time influences public opinion and so in turn influences the legislature itself when future
legislation is in question.
57. 638 H.C. DEB. 91 (1961).
58. DLTzam 18.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
It is not easy to see how a judgment that uses terms such as "abominable
vice" can be made "calmly and dispassionately." But, passing over this, we
find again in the quoted passage the unhelpful reference to a society's "rights"
to pass laws. There is no suggestion of an inquiry into the harm such homo-
sexual behaviour does to society, into the effectiveness of criminal prohibition
as a check, or into the evils which may attend criminal prohibition. The only
yardstick is the depth of disgust. As was seen earlier in the quotation from
Bentham, the utilitarian method does not deny the relevance of the majority's
passionate disapproval of a mode of conduct when contemplating its criminal
prohibition. But the utilitarian method leads one to evaluate that disgust in
terms of stated values, and, if it is found to be irrational, to bow to it only
with the greatest reluctance while continuing with strenuous attempts to
eradicate it through education. What is contemplated in Britain as a conse-
quence of the removal of the criminal prohibition on acts of homosexuality
done in private between consenting adults? Would there be riots in the
streets? Would homosexuals be stoned? If so, why does this not happen in the
great majority of European countries where such conduct is not criminally
prohibited? Can it be that the British are disgusted so much more easily than
the French or Italians?
To the qualification that the feeling of disgust must pass beyond the limits
of tolerance, Lord Devlin adds others, vzd., that the law should be "slow to
act" in making criminal prohibitions on matters of morals 0 and that "as
far as possible privacy should be respected."60 This is a welcome admission
that the individual's freedom of choice is a value to be set against the
reprobation of the right thinking man. The law, too, Lord Devlin tells us,
ought to be concerned with the minimum and not the maximum of moral
behaviour.68 These reservations, however, although they appear to temper
the severity of Lord Devlin's approach, are not finally reassuring, for we are
offered no guide as to their comparative importance when set beside the
reprobation of the "right minded person."
Towards the end of his lecture Lord Devlin gathers up his arguments and
illustrations into a central thesis. Society, he argues, depends for its stability
upon the existence of a common morality. This is as essential to its continuance
as the freedom from external aggression or from internal rebellion. It is,
therefore, not possible to mark out, as the Wolfenden Committee sought to do,
a sphere of private morality or private sin which can never be the law's
business. Thus he notes:
The error of jurisprudence in the Wolfenden Report is caused by the
search for some single principle to explain the division between crime and
sin. The Report finds it in the principle that the criminal law exists for
the protection of individuals .... But the true principle is that the law
exists for the protection of society. It does not discharge its function by
59. Id. at 19.
60. Ibid.
61. Id. at 20.
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protecting the individual from injury, annoyance, corruption and ex-
ploitation; the law must protect also the institutions and the community
of ideas, political and moral, without which people cannot live together.
Society cannot ignore the morality of the individual any more than it
can his loyalty; it flourishes on both and without either it dies.
6 2
Earlier he had observed:
I think, therefore, that it is not possible to set theoretical limits to the
power of the State to legislate against immorality.
63
The suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression
of subversive activities; it is no more possible to define a sphere of
private morality than it is to define one of private subversive activity. 4
We may agree tentatively with Lord Devlin that any attempt to plot an
area of human activity that can never be the business of the criminal law will
be difficult and dangerous. Certainly privacy cannot be the sole criterion,
though activities which are carried on privately are always less susceptible to
law enforcement and attempts at law enforcement in such areas always lead
to attendant dangers of blackmail. Lord Devlin himself gives the example
of a large proportion of society choosing to get drunk every night in the
privacy of their homes, his inference being that if this were to happen it
would be appropriate for the criminal law to intervene. 5 On the other hand,
it is arguable that if society came to such a pass the criminal law could do little
to rescue it. But, granting the point that it is possible to conceive of private,
immoral practices becoming so widespread that they are as much a danger to
society as armed rebellion, the inquiry cannot stop at that point.
In the first place condemnation of behaviour as "immoral" is not sufficient
to establish it as a danger to society. Lord Devlin suggests that the criminal law
exists for the protection of society rather than, or as well as, for the protection
of individuals. But as Bentham said, "An act cannot be detrimental to a state,
but by being detrimental to some one or more of the individuals that compose
it,"0 06 even though those individuals may not be identifiable. The "immorality"
with which the criminal law is concerned thus becomes that species of conduct
which is likely to harm specific individuals or an indefinite number of un-
identifiable individuals, which is capable of sufficiently precise definition to be
the subject of law enforcement, and which is by its nature susceptible to law
enforcement-always provided that the attempt to suppress it by law en-
forcement will not do more harm than good. Within this context there may be
wide divergences by minority groups from conventional mores which make
the intervention of the criminal law inexpedient. It is after all to be hoped
that one of the chief values of our "common morality" is tolerance and that
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 14.
64. Id. at 15.
65. Ibid.
66. BENTHAM, op. cit. smpra note 53, at 313.
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this is a value always to be weighed carefully when considering penal legisla-
tion. To contend that a minority sexual practice and armed rebellion, or
subversive activity and an equal attack upon the "common morality," are
equally deserving of criminal prohibition is to neglect that painstaking in-
quiry into the consequences of behavior and the efficacy of prohibition which
should always precede criminal enactments. What ideas are so built into our
"community of ideas" that to abandon them would mean destruction? What
institutions and practices are so fundamental that their modification would
mean disintegration? There is room for much disagreement here, and if
history teaches us anything it is that "fundamental institutions" and "built
in ideas" often may decay and be modified without any consequent catastrophe
for the society in question. "A rebel," Lord Devlin tells us, "may be rational
in thinking that he is right but he is irrational if he thinks that society can
leave him free to rebel."67 As it stands, this is a dangerous statement. If it is
confined to armed rebellion and treasonable activities it is innocuous. If it has
a wider meaning, as it seems to have in the context, it is alarmingly totali-
tarian. Our society rightly allows many lesser modes of rebellion, if by these
are meant deviations from the common morality. The Benthamite argument
will always be that such deviations should go untouched unless and until
they satisfy the utilitarian tests for the passage of criminal prohibition.
The weakness of Lord Devlin's position here is perhaps demonstrated by
a curious passage at the end of his lecture where he discusses the crime of
abortion. "[A] great many people nowadays," he complains, "do not under-
stand that abortion is wrong." 68 (The use of the word "understand" here
would seem to indicate some revelation granted to the author and which
many people have unfortunately not enjoyed.) Lord Devlin then goes on to
admit that the law prohibiting abortion functions very imperfectly and in
practice is invoked only when something has gone wrong and the woman has
died, or where a professional abortionist is involved.69 The result is that
abortion is in fact illegal because it is dangerous, is dangerous because it is
performed by the unskilled, and is performed by the unskilled because it is
illegal. It is therefore an excellent example of more harm than good resulting
from a criminal prohibition. While admitting this aspect of the matter, Lord
Devlin's comment is that this shows "what happens to the law in matters of
morality about which the community as a whole is not deeply imbued with a
sense of sin .... ,7o But since he has admitted that many people do not think
abortion is wrong, it is evident that by morality here he does not mean com-
monly shared attitudes of approval and disapproval but rather the morality of
a Church group.
This is expressed most frankly in the concluding paragraph of Lord
Devlin's lecture, which deserves to be quoted in full.
67. DEVLiN 25.
68. Id. at 24.
69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 25.
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A man who concedes that morality is necessary to society must support
the use of those instruments without which morality cannot be main-
tained. The two instruments are those of teaching, which is doctrine, and
of enforcement, which is the law. If morals could be taught simply on the
basis that they are necessary to society, there would be no social need
for religion; it could be left as a purely personal affair. But morality
cannot be taught in that way. Loyalty is not taught in that way either.
No society has yet solved the problem of how to teach morality without
religion. So the law must base itself on Christian morals and to the
limit of its ability enforce them, not simply because they are the morals of
most of us, nor simply because they are the morals which are taught by the
established Church--on these points the law recognizes the right to
dissent-but for the compelling reason that without the help of Christian
teaching the law will fail. 71
This passage is unconvincing mainly because it is never made clear what
is meant by "morality." To say that "morality is necessary to society" seems
to imply that morality is an additive which might be removed so as to secure
the collapse of society. If morality is taken to mean widely shared attitudes of
approval and disapproval towards modes of conduct, then morality is co-
existent with and coterminous with society and to speak of morality and society
as separate entities is meaningless. The question at issue is whether particular
attitudes of disapproval toward particular modes of conduct ought to be
supported by the prohibitions of the criminal law. On this point a paraphrase
of Lord Devlin's argument could perhaps fairly be put as follows: There are
some particular attitudes of disapproval which are necessary for the maintenance
of society. The most effective way of maintaining these attitudes is through
religion. The law must therefore support the churches by adding to their
influence the weight of criminal prohibition, where that can be effective. This
is something of a mutual bargain. The law must enforce Christian morals be-
cause without the help of Christian teaching generally the legal system as a
whole would be in danger.
This position can be attacked on various points. It provides no test at all
for deciding what disapproved conduct is so dangerous to society that it de-
serves criminal prohibition. It makes the very large assumption that society
cannot remain stable without religion, an assumption that seems to be
effectively contradicted by the experience of many contemporary societies.
And it makes the quite unjustified leap, even on its own premise, that the law
must enforce Christian morals simply because the Christian church is general-
ly speaking an effective upholder of the legal system. This is a point of view
that in England the Anglican church has itself abandoned, having spoken
out plainly in recent years in favour of the abolition of the criminal prohibi-
tions on homosexual behavior between consenting adults and on suicide.7 2
71. Ibid.
72. CHURCH OF ENGLAND MORAL'WELFARE COUNCIL, SEXUAL OFFENDERS AND SOCIAL
PUNISHMENT (1956) ; Report of a Committee appointed by the Archbishop of Canter-
bury, OUGHT SUcIE TO BE A CRIME? (1959).
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It may be well in conclusion to summarize briefly the relationship between
the criminal law and general moral feelings that is here advocated and to
indicate finally how Lord Devlin's position endangers this view.
Fortunately for humanity there is for the most part very wide agreement
in any given society about what values deserve to be protected and conse-
quently about what constitutes bad conduct that deserves to be discouraged.
There is such general agreement about the evil quality of killing, physical
violence, theft and damage to property that there is no need constantly to
be enunciating our scheme of values on these points. The hard core of the
criminal law has thus been pretty constant in all societies at all times in
recorded history. With the movement of opinion there is a contraction of some
areas of the criminal law and an expansion of others. So the definitions of
murder and manslaughter have become stricter and narrower over the cen-
turies while, on the other hand, the last two centuries have been a much
expanded list of offenses of fraud and dishonesty. It will be commonplace
to say that these changes reflect social, economic and intellectual develop-
ments that modify the set of public values. What the Benthamite position de-
mands is that we should not unreflectingly accept any part of our criminal
law simply because it is there and has been there for a long time, and that we
should not hastily enact any fresh prohibition without long and painful de-
bate. The examination of existing law and the debate about proposed laws
should be conducted by making as explicit a statement as is possible of the
values that the law is designed to protect, by a careful investigation of the
harm done to those values by the conduct prohibited or which it is sought to
prohibit, and by a careful consideration of the probable efficacy of legal pro-
hibition. In this debate the prevalence of feelings of disgust or revulsion in
the community towards given conduct is one factor to be considered and no
more than that. It can never replace careful investigation of the social conse-
quences of conduct and criminal prohibition, and if that careful investigation
returns a verdict contrary to that of the disgusted majority, then that majority
feeling must be ignored, unless to ignore it would lead to disturbance of a
kind more harmful than the prohibition in question. The legislator cannot be
wiser than he is, but he does not have to be as stupid as the stomach of the
man in the street.
This method of proceeding, that Bentham advocates, is rational only in
the sense that rational argument is possible after an explicit statement of values,
assuming that there is agreement about these values. The element of irration-
ality that inheres in any value judgment inheres in this method also and the
method is advanced therefore not because it is wholly rational but because it
is as rational as you can get and frankly confesses its irrational aspects.
My quarrel with Lord Devlin is thus not that he substitutes an irrational
method for a wholly rational one. By suggesting that the utilitarian method
purports to be a wholly rational one and by appearing to plead for a necessary
element of irrationality, Lord Devlin is in fact winning a hollow victory.
The objection is that Lord Devlin is denigrating the element of rationality
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that is possible and is, indeed, elevating irrationality to a dangerous peak. He
does this by concentrating, as the central point in his thesis, on the feelings
of reprobation of the man in the street and by correspondingly denying the
efficacy of the utilitarian examination of conduct which generates such feelings
in the man in the street. Dean Rostow, in commenting on Lord Devlin's lecture
and Professor Hart's retort, suggests that Lord Devlin has so qualified and
modified this central point that his final position is much the same as that of
those who seem to disagree with him and that the difference is at the most a
shift of emphasis.73 But it is surely a shift of emphasis that assumes vital
proportions, such an enormous difference of degree that it becomes a dif-
ference of kind. For the quarrel with Lord Devlin is ultimately a quarrel about
values. It is the value that he gives to the revulsions of the reasonable man that
is challenged, on the ground that the acceptance of his evaluation would
threaten other and more important values in our society. In opposition to
Lord Devlin's quietist acceptance of majority feeling we may finally set a
memorable passage from Bentham:
I suppose myself a stranger to all the common appellations of vice and
virtue. I am called upon to consider human actions only with relation to
their good or bad effects. I open two accounts; I pass to the account of
pure profit all the pleasures, I pass to the account of loss all the pains.
I faithfully weight the interests of all parties. The man whom pre-
judice brands as vicious, and he whom it extols as virtuous, are, for the
moment, equal in my eyes. I wish to judge prejudice itself; to weigh
all actions in a new balance, in order to form a catalogue of those which
ought to be permitted, and of those which ought to be forbidden.7 4
This is commended as a better text for the legislator than Lord Devlin's
lecture.
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